ABSTRACT Firewalls are computer systems that assess the network traffic using an ideally coherent and manageable set of rules. This study aims to provide means to measure the usability of firewall rule sets in terms of how easily IT professionals can understand and manage them. First, we conducted semi-structured interviews with system administrators wherein we obtained the usability challenges related to the management of firewall rule sets. This was followed by the analysis of related work. The interview results were combined with the findings from the related work. Accordingly, we acquired four usability attributes related to the manageability of firewalls; these were formally defined. We tested and measured the cognitive aspects related to the structure and ordering of the rules through a user study. A third user study with system administrators validated our metrics. It exhibited a very strong correlation between the metrics and how the administrators characterized usability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Firewalls are computer systems that mediate the access between two or more segments of a network or between the network interface and the rest of the computer system that hosts it. Firewalls are used to ensure that 1) authorized network traffic can be traversed and 2) unauthorized network traffic is blocked.
The decision taken by the firewall as to whether to allow or block the network traffic follows a set of rules. The general syntax of a firewall rule contains a set of conditions that may include a set of objects (e.g. a computer system or a network) and a decision. Decisions include, but are not limited to, allowing or blocking the network traffic. 1 A firewall parses the headers of the incoming and outgoing network packets and compares the output with its rules. This comparison is performed sequentially-it starts from the top of the rule set until the set of conditions for a given rule is satisfied and a decision to allow or block the network traffic is executed. Otherwise, a default (unconditional) rule is applied.
The rule set is not static. Rules might be added, changed, or removed from a rule set when, for example, the security policy is revised, the network topology is modified, or errors are detected. Therefore, system administrators that manage
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Jenny Mahoney. 1 Other decisions, such as logging an event, may exist depending on the implementation of the firewall.
firewall rule sets need to frequently review and update them. There is a need to improve the usability of the rule sets in terms of understandability and manageability to ensure that misconfigurations can be avoided. A measurable improvement requires the usability aspects related to the firewall rule sets to be identified and formally defined.
The objective of this study is to provide means to measure the usability of the firewall rule sets in terms of how easily they can be understood and managed by system administrators. In other words, we focus on two out of the three usability aspects defined by ISO [1] , namely efficiency and effectiveness. The research method used in this work is divided into four parts. (1) A pilot study is performed with system administrators through semi-structured interviews to elicit the challenges concerning the management of firewall rule sets. Additionally, a review of the scientific publications related to the usability aspects and security of rule sets, mainly from SOUPS, CHI, and network security venues, is prepared. ( 2) The outcome of the first part of our work-a set of challenges-is mathematically formalized into metrics, which are coded into shell scripts. (3) At this stage of the work, a study with computer science students is used to check whether the presence of similar successive rules in a rule set influences how a user perceives its complexity. (4) The final part is the validation of our metrics through a user study involving the system administrators. Our results show a strong correlation between the opinion of system administrators and the ranking produced by our metrics, which indicates that the usability of firewall rule sets can be automatically evaluated.
In the remainder of this paper, we summarize the pilot study in Section II and the background in Section III. By analyzing these sections, we identify four usability attributes related to the manageability of firewall rule sets in Section IV and formalize them into metrics in Section V. The effect of the cognitive aspects connected to the understanding of similar rules is tested and quantified in Section VI. We validate our metrics via a user study with system administrators in Section VII. The discussion of our findings and limitations and the conclusions are presented in Sections IX and X, respectively.
II. PILOT STUDY
To understand the problems related to the usability of firewall rule sets, it is crucial to obtain first-hand information from IT professionals, whose routine work involves configuring and managing firewalls. Our main goal was to understand the usability challenges faced by system administrators when working with firewalls.
A. PARTICIPANTS
Using our professional networks, we recruited eight system administrators from different organizations, including private and public (universities and research institutes) sectors, for a study that explored the main difficulties experienced by security experts when working with firewalls. All participants voluntarily agreed to take part in the interviews and received no financial or any other type of compensation for their participation in our pilot study.
All participants were males, between 26 and 62 years (µ = 44.6, σ = 10.1), with an average work experience of 13 years (σ = 6.6) in managing firewall rule sets. All participants had almost identical responsibilities in managing network security devices, such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems. They had worked with both Windows and Unix-like systems, and the size of the networks managed by them varied from 50 to 850 devices. It should be noted that none of the interviewees are related to the authors' research group.
B. METHODOLOGY
Semi-structured interviews were used as the method of inquiry in our pilot study. They offer the flexibility we needed to conduct the interviews. They enabled us to focus on the main usability challenges related to the configuration and management of firewalls and ask follow-up questions. Thus, we obtained detailed comments about specific issues and working methods.
Six interviews were conducted in person and the remaining two over the phone. The only difference in the procedure was that for the telephonic interviews, the consent form was sent via e-mail beforehand. Each interview lasted between 35 minutes and one hour.
An interview guide (see Appendix A) was prepared to maintain consistency across all sessions. All participants provided informed consent to participate in the study and be audio-recorded. The interviews started off with a brief explanation of the procedure to the participants. During the interviews, the following topics were discussed:
• Background information.
• Efforts to maintain firewalls.
• Responsibilities and coordination.
• Firewall configuring process. All interviews were held in English and conducted by the same interviewer who took notes and audio-recorded the conversation for the further thematic analysis of the obtained data. We manually coded the responses to the open-ended questions using a descriptive coding approach [2] . The coding was implemented by the main author of this paper and reviewed by two senior researchers.
C. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
This and all subsequent user studies were performed in European countries following the National Ethical Review Act Law [3] and the Good Research Practice guidelines provided by the National Research Council of Sweden [4] . The studies in this research work were designed such that they did not require ethical approval, i.e. no sensitive personal data were collected and there was no mental or physical intervention. The following steps were taken to ensure that the participants were treated ethically and with respect in this and all the successive studies:
• The participants were informed of the goal of the study and that participation in the study was voluntary.
• The minimum amount of personal data (gender, age, and experience with firewalls, if applicable) and no sensitive personal data were collected.
• The participants were informed of the data being collected, our commitment to confidentiality, and their rights as participants.
• No dependent relationship exists between the subjects and the moderators. Additionally, we took the following measure for this user study:
• The participants provided written informed consent to be audio-recorded before starting the study. The informed consent form also stated our commitment to confidentiality and their rights as participants (in particular, the right to withdraw from the study at any point in time).
D. RESULTS
During the analysis, the following four themes related to firewall usability challenges were identified, namely firewall management challenges, misconfiguration scenarios, helping approaches/tools, and recommendations for the configuration process. Note that these themes arise from the data itself; thus, they are not directly related to the topics in which the questions were originally grouped. 
3) HELPING APPROACHES AND TOOLS
The system administrators reported the use of different approaches and mechanisms that help them better configure and manage firewalls, including good and up-to-date documentation, network management, and testing tools. The most popular (used by all the respondents) technique is adding comments in the configuration files, which are usually managed by more than one system administrator, and, therefore, need to be ideally understandable and well-documented. Out of the eight interviewed system administrators, seven had colleagues that they cooperated with in the management of firewalls and other security devices.
4) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CONFIGURATION PROCESS
Our respondents gave some recommendations for the firewall configuration process. Six system administrators advised to have a regular audit of the firewall policies and configuration files to mitigate the risk of data security breaches. Another system administrators mentioned to ''Keep your configuration as simple as possible.'' All system administrators stated that maintaining up-to date documentation, including comments in the configuration files, is crucial for the firewall configuring process. The outcome of the pilot study is a set of three aspects that impact the usability of firewall rule sets:
(A1) The size of the rule set and the length of its rules. (A2) The presence of errors (misconfigurations). (A3) The presence of comments in the configuration files.
III. BACKGROUND
Publications on or related to metrics for the usability and manageability of firewall rule sets can be found in SOUPS and CHI, e.g. [5] - [7] . Apart from these results, other publications found lack validation with user studies. Although most of them are purely theoretical, they stress the relevance of the problem of quantifying the usability of rule sets. The literature review on the usability of firewall configuration by Voronkov et al. [8] investigates solutions to help professional and non-professional users in creating and managing firewall configuration files, and analyzes such solutions in respect to usability. The authors observe that there is a general lack of usability evaluation or user studies for validating the claims in the 14 articles included in the systematic literature review. We revisit the publications cited by Voronkov et al. related to the metrics for the usability and manageability of firewall rule sets and include additional work related to the complexity analysis of firewall configuration files.
The work by Beckerle and Martucci [5] proposed formal metrics to measure the security and usability of usable access control rule sets. Starting with a pilot study involving system administrators, the authors formalized a set of security and usability metrics and evaluated their impact on the implementation of an access control security policy. The authors validated their findings through a second user study with system administrators. In our work, we follow a similar research method that includes a pilot study, formalization of the usability attributes, and a user study with system administrators to validate our findings.
Usability aspects in the configuration of firewalls often appear in the literature as studies of their complexity. User studies from Smetters and Good [6] and Mazurek et al. [7] on the manageability of access control rule sets show that complexity is a key problem. Wool's investigation of firewall configuration files found errors in all rule sets that were analyzed [9] . Wool proposed a metric to classify the rule sets into two groups according to their complexity, i.e. simple and complicated sets. Wool's metric considered three factors, namely 1) the number of rules in the set, 2) the number of devices listed in the set, and 3) the number of interfaces on the firewall [10] . Wool's metrics were designed for two enterprise firewalls: Check Point Firewall-1 and Cisco PIX.
The number of elements in a rule set is also a part of metrics from other authors, such as Tongaonkar et al. [11] . The authors analyzed the complexity following a three-step process. First, all dependencies between the rules were eliminated; thus, the order of appearance of the rules in the set was not important. This resulted in an equivalent rule set that was much larger than the original set. In the second step, the set size was reduced by merging the rules. Third, the complexity of the set was measured by counting the number of elements in the reduced rule set.
Wong [12] proposed complexity metrics for firewall configuration with quantitative models that were originally designed for software engineering, i.e. the Halstead (lexical) complexity [13] and the Cyclomatic (structural) complexity [14] . The variables considered to measure the lexical complexity of a configuration file included 1) the number of distinct operators and operands and 2) the total number of operators and operands. Structural complexity measures the number of linearly independent paths in a rule set, which was used by Wong to evaluate the relation between the rule sets of multiple firewalls in a network.
Two formal metrics to analyze the complexity of firewall configuration files were proposed by Acharya et al. [15] . The dependency metric examined the relationship between a rule and its preceding rules in the set (the more dependencies, the more complex a set is). The inversion metric denoted the number of pairs of adjacent rules with different decisions, where a decision is a Boolean parameter (accept or discard). The metric indicated whether the configuration file is ''hard'' or ''easy'' to understand. The authors also provided an algorithm to remove irrelevant rules from the set.
Bhatt et al. [16] described a firewall analysis tool and a set of metrics for rule set remediation and comparison. The proposal comprised six metrics from a set of arbitrarily defined properties. The metrics proposed by Bhatt et al. calculated the relationship between rules, network addresses, and services, and whether they can be triggered (in the case of rules) or appear in the set (for network addresses and services). The tool was developed for Check Point Firewall-1, an enterprise firewall, and tested on ca. 50 Firewall-1 configuration files.
Al-Haj et al. [17] suggested three formal metrics for firewall rule sets in terms of security, performance, and manageability, i.e. 1) Security metrics captured how permissive the rule set is and how data flows are distributed over the destination addresses; 2) Performance metrics counted the number of unused rules and how often rules were triggered; and 3) Manageability metrics referred to the assessment of the rule set complexity by observing the ratio of ALLOW rules in the set for a given destination address and the relationships between source and destination addresses in the set.
Chen et al. [18] proposed a set of metrics to quantify the complexity of a firewall rule set to quantify the human perceived complexity. They classified complexity into two groups: inherent and representational. Inherent complexity is measured by examining the minimum number of accepted overlapping rules and the minimum number of rules required to express a security policy. Representational complexity refers to the number of rules checked before a decision is made to accept or reject a packet.
All metrics related to the usability of firewall rule sets are summarized in Table 1 .
The outcome of the analysis of the related works is an affecting usability aspect that was not included by (A1), (A2), and (A3) identified in the pilot study, namely:
(A4) The structural complexity of the rule set.
IV. USABILITY ATTRIBUTES
After analyzing the results of the pilot study and related work (Sections II and III, respectively), we identified the following four usability attributes for measuring the manageability of a firewall rule set. where (A1), (A2), and (A3) are the usability attributes derived from the interviews with system administrators in the pilot study and also reported in the literature, and (A4) is derived exclusively from the related work. The first, third, and fourth identified attributes are related to both efficiency and effectiveness usability aspects, while the second attribute is only related to effectiveness. These attributes are discussed in the following subsections and are the basis for the formalization of our metrics described in Section V.
A. HUMAN PERCEIVED COMPLEXITY
The (A1) aspect identified in our pilot study shows that the size of the rule set and length of its rules are a key aspect in measuring the usability of a rule set. This fact is reinforced by the analysis of background work in Section III. Wool [10] , Beckerle and Martucci [5] , Tongaonkar et al. [11] , and Wong [12] used the size of the rule set and/or the length of the rules (or their component parts) as input to their metrics.
To quantify the size of the rule set and the length of its rules in a single numeric value, we investigated the number of options and parameters (such as commands and protocols) in the rule set. For instance, the iptables rule:
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 --sport 53 -j ACCEPT has five parameters: -A, -p, --dport, --sport, and -j.
Simply counting the number of elements in the rule set may mask the cognitive aspects related to the structure of the rule set along with the ordering and organization of rules in the set. This aspect is hinted at in the literature in the work by [18] on human perceived complexity and can be related to the dependency metric proposed by Acharya et al. [15] if interpreted from a cognitive perspective. We suspect that the cognitive aspects may have a significant role in the evaluation of the elements of a rule set.
Our hypothesis is that if a rule is similar to an immediate predecessor, the effort required to understand the rule is reduced. Two consecutive rules are similar if the same keys appear at the same positions in both. Henceforth, we refer to options and parameters as keys. According to this definition, the following two rules:
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 --sport 53 -j ACCEPT -A INPUT -p udp --dport 88 --sport 25 -j ACCEPT are similar because they both have the same five keys (-A, -p, --dport, --sport, and -j) appearing in the same order.
We test our hypothesis via a user study. The user study and its results are presented in Section VI. We describe the calculation of similarity between rules and show the presence of a cognitive effect related to analyzing consecutive similar rules. We also demonstrate that this effect can be quantified. We then propose a weighting component to consider the cognitive effort taken by a system administrator when analyzing a rule set and include it in our formalization.
We call this usability attribute (A1) human perceived complexity because it considers the reduction in the cognitive effort of system administrators when examining similar rules.
B. CONFLICTS IN THE RULE SET
The (A2) aspect identified in our pilot study shows that misconfigurations negatively impact the usability of a rule set (Section II). The detection of errors and conflicts was also a part of the complexity metrics proposed by Bhatt et al. [16] and Acharya et al. [15] . However, not all misconfigurations can be detected by parsing a rule set because they may result, for instance, from a misinterpretation of the security policy by the system administrators. 2 By limiting our analysis to the information available in the rule set, we aim to detect the conflicts in it. Conflicts might be the result of misconfigurations in some cases but in others, they are required or desired to simplify other aspects of the rule set, as pointed out by Berckerle and Martucci [5] . Conflicts are a superset of misconfigurations (that do not occur due to the incorrect interpretation of high-level policies); a misconfiguration is always a conflict, while a conflict is not always a misconfiguration. Unlike misconfigurations, all conflicts can be detected in the rule set and thus, we focus on them. Conflicts include problems such as redundancy and irrelevant rules that were referred to in the pilot study as misconfigurations. To qualify and quantify the conflicts, we use the classification proposed by Al-Shaer and Hamed [20] , which considered five types of conflicts.
• Shadowing: a rule B is called shadowed if all suitable packets are already processed by a preceding rule A; thus, the rule B will never be triggered and the rules take different actions.
• Correlation: rules A and B are correlated if rule A processes some packets that could be processed by rule B and vice versa, and the rules take different actions.
• Generalization: a rule A is generalized by a following rule B if rule B can process all packets that were handled by rule A, and the rules take different actions.
• Redundancy: a rule is called redundant if all packets can be processed without it; thus, its removal does not affect the security policy.
• Irrelevance: a rule is irrelevant if no packets can be processed by this rule. Al-Shaer and Hamed proved that they defined all possible relations that might exist between firewall rules and, therefore, the mentioned five types of conflicts are a universal set.
C. COMMENTS IN THE RULE SET
The (A3) aspect identified in our pilot study shows that the presence of comments in the configuration file can improve its usability and help a system administrator to better manage it. All system administrators interviewed in the pilot study mentioned comments in the rule set as regular practice that helps their work. Figure 1 depicts a snippet of an iptables rule set with comments.
The NIST SP 800-41 guidelines for firewalls [21] Ideally, comments should be checked, and their values determined. However, this analysis goes beyond the scope of this work. In this paper, we therefore assume that all comments are meaningful and they all provide the same level of benefit regarding the usability of the rule set.
D. STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
This usability aspect is identified in the literature and it is related to the Cyclomatic (structural) complexity metric proposed by Wong [12] . Wong used it in the evaluation of rule sets of multiple firewalls in a network. We use it to evaluate the inter-dependencies in the set, which appear when the rule set is branched (branches may result from jump or goto commands). The presence of jump and return commands increases the complexity of the rule set because multiple linearly independent paths can be followed. This implies that rule sets cannot just be analyzed from top to bottom, which complicates their understandability. Hence, rule sets with no branches are the simplest when considering the structural complexity.
V. FORMALIZATION
Here we formalize the affecting usability attributes, described in Section IV. It is necessary to introduce some basic building blocks to formalize rule sets. Owing to this formalization, we obtain a set of metrics that can be used to evaluate the usability of a rule set.
A. BASIC BUILDING BLOCKS
The following definitions will be used as a basis for the formalization. The general set nomenclature is used, i.e. lower case letters denote single elements and capital letters denote sets.
Definition 1: Key k. A key k is an option or a parameter that needs to be checked. K and K denote the set of all keys and a subset of keys, respectively. These blocks are derived from the basic building blocks that were introduced in the previous subsection.
Definition 4: Condition c. A condition c is a pair of a key k and the corresponding set values V k . C is used for the set of all conditions; C is a subset of the conditions.
The set of all rules is denoted by R.
where n is the number of rules in the rule set
where m is the number of keys in the rule. 
1) PERCEIVED HUMAN COMPLEXITY
As mentioned previously, the perceived human complexity of a rule set depends on the number of keys (m) and the weight factor (w) of each rule. The number of keys for the i th rule can be found using the following equation:
From Definition 10, f weight takes the distance d between two rules as a parameter and returns the corresponding value of the weight factor. Thus, we can assign a proper weight factor w i to each rule:
where d i is the distance between the i th and (i − 1) th rules, i.e. the distance between two consecutive rules.
The perceived human complexity M 1 of a rule set is:
2) NUMBER OF CONFLICTS
By considering the study by Al-Shaer and Hamed [20] , we can formalize the number of conflicts in a rule set as follows. In our formalization, we do not consider the irrelevance aspect because it is impossible to know whether a rule is irrelevant without the knowledge of the security policy (see Section IV).
• Shadowing: r i , r j : i < j; r j is shadowed by r i iff:
• Generalization: r i , r j : i < j; r j is a generalization of r i iff:
• Redundancy: r i , r j : i < j; r j is redundant to r i iff:
∃r z : r i correlated with or generalized by r z , where i < z < j
From the above formalization, we obtain the total number of conflicts s. The number of conflicts s equals M 2 .
As mentioned in Section IV, some conflicts might be added on purpose by the system administrators to simplify other aspects of the rule set, such as to reduce the number of rules in the set [5] . Our metric on the number of conflicts in the rule set does not differentiate on the basis of whether a conflict was added by a system administrator on purpose. In any case, if conflicts are intentionally added to the rule set to improve its understandability or manageability, they should be captured by the improvements in our metrics M 1 and/or M 4 .
3) NUMBER OF COMMENTS
The number of comment blocks q is M 3 .
4) STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY
M 4 is equal to the number of jumps to user-defined chains 3 and RETURN jumps. It is calculated as follows:
where userChain is the name of a user-defined chain.
5) THE COMPOUND USABILITY METRIC
After the four metrics have been defined and mathematically formalized, we can combine them into a compound usability metric M to measure the manageability of a firewall rule set. The greater the M , the worse a rule set is in terms of manageability (note that M 3 is negative because comments are considered to improve the usability).
where 1,2,3,4 > 0 are weights of each metric.
VI. PERCEIVED COGNITIVE EFFORT
The perceived cognitive effort taken when analyzing a rule set is the object of study in this section. As mentioned in Section IV, we want to test whether there is a reduction in the perceived cognitive effort required to understand a rule if it is similar to the immediately preceding rule. In addition, if such a reduction exists, then how should it be quantified? We defined the following null hypothesis H 0 and the alternative hypothesis H 1 .
• H 0 : The cognitive effort required to understand a rule is not affected by its immediately preceding rule.
• H 1 : The cognitive effort required to understand a rule is affected by its immediately preceding rule.
To test for similarity, we use two criteria, i.e. 1) the diversity of keys used in a rule and 2) the order in which keys appear in the rule.
To compare the similarity of rules using the aforementioned criteria, we introduced the notion of distance (d) between the rules (Definition 7 in Section V). We use the string metric called Full Damerau-Levenshtein distance (not to be confused with the optimal string alignment distance) [23] - [25] as the distance calculation function (Definition 8 in Section V). The selected string metric can be used with our criteria and returns a non-negative integer value. 4 To test our hypothesis H 0 , we designed a complexity evaluation rating experiment for an audience familiar with firewall configuration files. Note that to test the weight factor w i of M 1 metric, we control all dimensions of the compound usability metric M (m i , which is the same for all rules, M 2 = M 3 = M 4 = 0). 3 Non-standard chains defined by users. 4 Additional information about the Damerau-Levenshtein distance is given in Appendix B.
A. PRE-STUDY
A pre-study with seven participants was conducted to better design the main study. In the pre-study, we first used blocks of standard iptables rules, as shown in Figure 1 . The feedback obtained from the participants led us to adopt iptables-like rules expressed in natural language, avoid the use of complete alphanumeric values of IP and MAC addresses, and replace them with shortened textual representations, such as Ipaddr01.
Natural language was chosen to help the participants who were not familiar with iptables because proficiency with iptables was not a requirement for the experiment. Hence, the following rule: TCP traffic from source address Ipaddr44 to destination address Ipaddr01 ACCEPT
B. PARTICIPANTS
The participants in the main study comprised 20 graduate and undergraduate computer science students that were recruited through an in-class announcement and on an individual basis in other cases. During the recruitment process, the candidates were informed about the general idea of the study and asked whether they were interested in participating. We mentioned that the study would take between 20 and 30 min and participation was completely voluntary. All participants had passed at least one Computer Security course beforehand and had lectures and laboratory exercises on the configuration of firewalls. The participants were between the ages of 21 and 54 years (µ = 26.0, σ = 7.0), with 16 males and four females. They received a chocolate bar for their participation in our study. No other financial compensation was offered to them.
C. METHODOLOGY
We gathered data using an offline version of the Subjective Mental Effort Questionnaire (SMEQ) rating method, also known as the Rating Scale Mental Effort [26] . This method was demonstrated to have good sensitivity and to be valid and reliable [26] , [27] . In the offline version of SMEQ, the user study participants use a vertical scale to assess the effort required to perform a task.
In our user study, a slightly modified version of SMEQ was used. We only used its categorical scale (from ''Not at all hard to do'' to ''Tremendously hard to do'') and removed its numerical scale. The modified SMEQ scale used in our study is depicted in Figure 2 . This was a design decision taken to force all participants to evaluate the blocks using the same vocabulary and not to be confused with the double scale. The numerical scale was later used in our evaluation. To define the number of keys to be included in the rules, we examined 50 iptables rule sets to determine their usual number of keys. The rule sets were obtained from a public github repository. 5 The repository is a collection of realworld firewall rule sets donated by IT professionals. Our analysis shows that 81% of all rules have five or less keys, which we judged to be a reasonable number of keys to be used in our sample rules.
We created ten blocks of iptables-like rules expressed in a natural language, with each block having three rules. The distance d between consecutive rules in each block is always the same.
The distances used are d = {0, 1, 2, 3, 5}; hence, for each of the five distances considered, there are two blocks of rules. The results of the pre-study indicated that the difference between d = {3, 4, 5} is not significant: related-samples Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed no difference between the means of these three distances. Therefore, to ensure conciseness in the experiment, we decided not to add two additional blocks (2 × 3 rules) with d = 4. One of the three-rule blocks with distance d = 2 used in this user study is illustrated in Figure 3 .
D. PROTOCOL
The experiment was conducted individually. We started by informing the participants that the collected data would be anonymized and used only for research purposes. After obtaining their informed consent, we proceeded with the user study. It consisted of two parts, i.e. 1) reading the blocks of firewall rules and 2) rating them using the SMEQ scale. The experiment lasted for 25 min on average per participant. We told our participants that they could ask questions throughout the study if something was unclear. 5 https://github.com/diekmann/net-network In the beginning of the user study, a preliminary exercise was given to introduce the syntax used in the study and allow the participants to express their concerns about the experiment in general. At first, the participants were shown three rules. The first rule was explained to them. Then, the interviewer asked them to explain the remaining two rules to check their understanding of the syntax. If the participant failed to explain the second rule correctly, the interviewer would explain its meaning and ask the participant to explain the third rule. Otherwise, the experiment proceeded.
Each participant was then given the ten blocks of rules printed on separate pieces of paper. The blocks were all given at the same time and in no particular order (they were shuffled and given as a deck) to eliminate the influence of any learning factor; e.g. latter blocks of rules are more easily perceived than the first ones. The participants were then asked to read the blocks of rules and understand their functionality with no need to memorize the rules.
After the participants were done with the first task, the rating part of the experiment began. We gave the participants the SMEQ scale printed on an A4 sheet of paper. The participants were then asked to estimate the amount of effort required to understand each block (of three rules) and place it on the SMEQ scale.
E. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the ethical considerations in Section II-C:
• The recruitment announcement was made during the final lecture of an undergraduate course by its teacher, who is not involved in this research work. No names of the interested students were collected in the classroom to avoid peer-pressure or any other type of coercion. The candidates were asked to contact us by email or phone.
• We offered a chocolate bar as compensation for participating in the study. No course points or similar rewards were offered.
F. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The outcome of the experiment was 20 SMEQ scales, one from each participant (see an example in Appendix C). Each scale had ten marks, where each mark corresponded to the effort required for a given block to be understood. The ten marks were mapped to the numerical values of the SMEQ scale (that were not shown to the participants). To compare the results for different distances and test our hypothesis, we first normalized the participants' feedback. The normalization was performed in three steps. (1) The feedback of each participant, i.e. ten marks with their corresponding numerical values from the SMEQ scale, was divided into five groups based on the distance d of the blocks to which they were assigned, i.e. a group of two values from the blocks with d = 0, a group of two values from the blocks with d = 1, and so on. (2) The two values in each group were summed and the value obtained was assigned to the corresponding group. (3) The values were normalized in relation to the value of the group with d = 5. 6 The result comprised 20 sets of normalized data, where each set contains five numerical values, one for each distance d = {0, 1, 2, 3, 5}.
After the normalization of the data, the average of the derived normalized data was calculated according to the distances d. The dependence of the weight factor on the distance is presented in Figure 4 .
The results are used to test our null hypothesis H 0 . A paired sample t-test was used in the analysis, and the outcome is presented in Table 2 . The datasets (for each distance) are normally distributed (see Table 3 ) and do not have outliers. The paired sample t-test shows that there is a significant difference in the means for d = 0 and d = 1; d = 1 and d = 2; and d = 2 and d = 3; the effect size is medium for the second pair and large for the first and third pairs [28] . Two distances, d = 3 and d = 5, do not differ significantly, and that coheres with our assumption.
Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis H 0 and accept H 1 , i.e. the cognitive effort required to understand a rule is affected by its preceding rule.
Our results also indicate that the perceived cognitive effort is not linear to the tested distance d. A logistic regression, i.e. the interpolation of our data by a sigmoid curve, indicates that the relation between the weight factor and the distance d is given by the function:
The logistic regression is shown in Figure 5 . Additional details about the statistical analysis are given in Appendix D.
VII. VALIDATION
We conducted a user study with system administrators to evaluate the quality of the metrics formalized in Section V. This study aimed to determine whether our compound usability metric can assess the usability of rule sets like system administrators.
For this study, the proposed metrics were coded into shell scripts. Some clarifications need to be given. understand and manage them according to their expert opinion. We selected 12 rule sets from the same github repository mentioned in Section VI in accordance with the following three criteria:
1) The upper threshold of the number of rules in a rule set is approximately 100. An upper threshold was established to limit the length of the experiment and minimize the odds of losing participants that might be turned down by the length of the rule sets, especially because they are asked to evaluate 12 of them.
2) The median value of the number of rules in the subset of the rule sets to be evaluated by the participants is approximately the same as the median of all rule sets of the github repository (approximately 35 rules). 3) Only iptables rule sets were considered because a) a single syntax for all rule sets eliminates an independent variable in our analysis, b) the majority of rule sets available in the repository are written using the iptables syntax, and c) iptables is CLI-based, which is preferred by system administrators according to Botta et al. [29] , Haber and Bailey [30] , and Wong [12] , and it is a part of the Linux kernel. The results of this study were analyzed using the Spearman rank correlation test [31] . The main advantage of this test is that it does not carry any assumptions about the distribution of data [32] . Spearman's correlation coefficient assesses how well the relationship between two ranked variables can be described using a monotonic function.
In our experiment, the output of a Spearman rank correlation test is a rank of the understandability and manageability of the firewall rule sets.
C. PROTOCOL
The experiment was conducted offline and individually. First, we informed the participants about the goal and procedure of this user study in person or on phone. We obtained the participants' consent and proceeded with the experiment. It consisted of two sequential tasks, i.e. 1) reading the iptables rule sets and 2) ranking them.
The system administrators were sent a file via e-mail containing 12 iptables rule sets in text format. They were asked 1) to read the rule sets and understand their functionality and, after completing the first task, 2) rank the rule sets according to the amount of effort that would be required to understand and manage them, from the least to the most amount of effort.
The participants used their own computers for this study. The experiment was carried out without the presence or interference of interviewers or observers, at their own offices or homes. In addition, no time limit was stipulated for completing the experiment. The participants were instructed to return their completed rankings back to us via email. After receiving their rankings, we contacted them again to schedule an exit (semi-structured) interview, which was conducted in person or on phone.
The experiment setting was defined as-is because it was not possible to set up long, in-person experiment sessions with the system administrators, and allow them to complete the experiment according to their time constraints and in a familiar environment.
In this experiment, the ethical considerations, laws, and guidelines described in Section II-C were followed.
D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The experiment resulted in eight rankings from the system administrators that were used to compute an average ranking (average). The average was calculated as follows: for each rule set, we computed its average ranking and re-ranked the rule sets according to their averages.
We tested for correlation between the average and each of the eight individual rankings from the system administrators.
The resulting Spearman rank correlation coefficients (r s ) varied between strong and very strong (0.713 ≤ r s ≤ 0.881).
The experiment results were then compared against rankings generated by scripts that implemented our four usability metrics. Two variations of our metrics were coded; one that considers the effect of immediately preceding rules in the calculation of the perceived complexity of a rule set (the values w for each rule are obtained from the function f weight , Equation 6 in Section VI), and one that does not (the weight factor w of each rule is considered to be equal to 1).
The results and analysis of our user study on the perceived cognitive effort (Section VI-F) indicated that the immediately preceding rule should affect the human perceived complexity (A1). Therefore, to validate our results, we tested both variations of our metrics using the same 12 iptables rule sets that were given to the system administrators. Two rankings were then obtained; affected, which accounted for the cognitive effect of the preceding rule, and not_affected, which did not.
We tested for correlation between average and affected, and between average and not_affected. The resulting Spearman rank correlation coefficients were found to be very strong for the pair {average, affected} (r s = 0.881) and strong for the pair {average, not_affected} (r s = 0.762). Table 4 summarizes the Spearman correlation test results. It shows that the automatically generated ranking affected is closer to average for all but one participant (sa_5).
The analysis of the results demonstrates the following:
• Our usability attributes and metrics perform as well as the system administrators in ranking the understandability and manageability of the 12 iptables rule sets in our experiment. It validates our proposed usability attributes and metrics, which were identified from the analysis of our pilot study results and related work and formalized in Section V.
• Our result analysis from the laboratory experiment with CS students in Section VI is correct. In this experiment with system administrators, the results show that the correlation between average and affected is significantly better than that between average and not_affected. It validates that the perceived cognitive effort to understand a rule is affected by its immediately preceding rule.
VIII. LIMITATIONS
There are practical and theoretical limitations to our work. The most challenging problem was to recruit system administrators for our validation experiment (Section VII), whose completion required a considerable amount of time. In the exit interviews, our participants reported to have spent between 90 minutes to an entire day finalizing the ranking experiment. We aimed to keep our validation experiment as short as possible. Therefore, we decided not to include the tests that verified how well the system administrators understood the 12 rule sets included in our validation experiment. Tests could have been implemented by extending the experiment with questions, such as ''what is the outcome of the arrival of packet p in the network?'' and ''how would you modify this rule set to reject (or accept) the packets addressed to IP <ip_address>?'' However, we considered that it would extend the experiment and subsequently increase the drop rate of participants. As system administrator volunteers are very difficult to recruit, we decided to trust their experience and expertise (self-reported) in firewalls instead of risking a reduction in our pool of participants.
The practical limitations of our user study in Section VI are as follows. (1) It is designed with blocks of three rules each, where the distance between two consecutive rules is always constant. We decided not to use blocks with more rules because they would have extended the study significantly. For instance, if blocks of five rules were used, then 66% more rules would be required to be read and understood by the participants. (2) CS Students were recruited for this experiment because our planned statistical analysis required a relatively large number of respondents and face-toface interaction between the participants and the interviewer. The study goal (to test for the perceived cognitive effort) and its limited knowledge requirements also attributed to this decision; furthermore, it was difficult to recruit system administrators.
From the theoretical standpoint, we cannot prove that our usability attributes are fully comprehensive because they are identified via interviews with system administrators and derived from related work. There may exist other attributes, which were not identified in our research, that influence the manageability of a firewall rule set.
Finally, in our validation study, we considered all four usability attributes to be of equal importance (the weights 1,2,3,4 of the metrics are considered equal), but we cannot prove whether this is valid. There may be a dominant attribute that should be given higher importance when measuring the understandability and manageability of a rule set.
IX. DISCUSSION
The four usability attributes identified in this paper extend the related work in several aspects. Human perceived complexity (A1) considers the number of elements in a rule set, its structure, ordering, and organization. The metrics proposed in the literature only consider the number of rules and network topology [9] or the number of keys [5] , [11] .
A novel contribution of our work is related to the identification and quantification of the effect on the perceived cognitive effort caused by the appearance of consecutive rules in the set. We set a null hypothesis to test if ''the perceived cognitive effort required to understand a rule is not affected by its immediately preceding rule.'' The results from our experiment (Section VI) show that the preceding rule affects the cognitive effort required to understand a rule. We not only identified that the effect exists, but also formalized and quantified it.
The conflicts in a rule set usability attribute (A2) quantifies the impact of the manageability of a rule set by accounting for the number of conflicting rules. Conflicts in rule sets are mostly studied from the perspective of computer and network security but, as indicated in our pilot study, they also affect the manageability of a rule set. Three existing usability metrics incorporate the aspects related to conflicts. Beckerle and Martucci's usability metrics for access control [5] considered the same four types of conflicts considered by us in A2. Other proposals that suggested measuring the effect of conflicts in the usability of firewall rule sets unfortunately lacked evaluation studies to validate their claims [15] , [16] .
The analysis of the pilot study shows that adding comments to the configuration file is the most common technique used by system administrators to help them better manage their firewall rule sets. This is considered by our usability attribute related to comments in the rule set (A3). To the best of our knowledge, our set of usability metrics is the only one that considers comments in the rule set in its computation.
The structural complexity usability attribute (A4) is used to measure the inter-dependencies in the rule set. This attribute was first identified by Wong [12] in her study on rule set inter-dependencies between multiple firewalls. In contrast to Wong, we examined the structural complexity of a single rule set. We used it to evaluate the inter-dependencies in the rule set, i.e. the branches that may result from jump or goto commands, which is yet another novel contribution of our work.
The results from our validation study in Section VII demonstrate that our usability attributes and metrics perform as well as a system administrator when evaluating the manageability of a firewall rule set. Furthermore, our shell scripts evaluate the rule sets automatically to yield results in less than a minute, while the system administrators reported to have spent between 90 minutes to an entire day for ranking the 12 rule sets in the exit interviews.
Although we only used the iptables rule sets in the validation study, the metrics are not limited to this particular firewall. The configuration files of other firewalls (e.g. firewalld and nftables) can also be evaluated using the same usability aspects (not necessarily all). This might, however, require some adjustments in the formalization owing to the differences in syntax and the presentation of the rules. It is important to note that in this paper, we focus on firewalls that work on layers 2, 3, and 4 of the OSI model, i.e. we do not consider the application layer firewalls.
A. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Our usability attributes and metrics offer a scientific method for quantifying the manageability of firewall rule sets. Our results point to practical implications that benefit system administrators in managing firewall rule sets. (1) The formalization and its implementation help in automatically assessing the manageability of a rule set and comparing different rule sets that implement the same security policy. ( 2) The knowledge of individual metrics for each usability attribute helps to quickly identify the weaknesses in the rule sets regarding their manageability. (3) The four usability attributes and metrics define an optimization problem, i.e. the manageability of a rule set, that can be optimized following our four usability attributes using a machine-learning approach. System administrators may define their own optimization criteria, i.e. select if the overall metric should be targeted for optimization, or set a priority list for usability attributes to be optimized first.
X. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduced four usability attributes that impact the manageability of firewall rule sets. They were identified from the results of a pilot study with eight system administrators and the related work. A user study was designed to test whether the perceived cognitive effort is affected by the appearance of rules in the firewall rule set. We demonstrated the impact and quantified it. The formalization of the proposed four usability attributes were coded into shell scripts. To validate our attributes and metrics, we conducted a ranking experiment with the system administrators. The statistical analysis of the results showed that the ranking obtained from our usability attributes and metrics were very strongly correlated with the participants' average ranking, i.e. our attributes and metrics performed as well as the system administrators.
APPENDIXES APPENDIX A INTERVIEW GUIDE

A. INTRODUCTION
Hi, my name is [name] . I am a researcher at [institution] . The reason we invited you to participate in this study is because our research group wants to learn more about the main difficulties that system administrators face when working with firewalls. Our goal is to provide usable tools to help system administrators better manage firewalls. Before we start, I have this consent form for you to read and sign.
The participation in this interview is voluntary and, as the consent form states, you can withdraw from it at any time. We will delete all data collected at your request. The expected time commitment is approximately 40 minutes. If you have any questions or concerns, feel free to ask me. If it is okay, I will start audio-recording this session. This record and the notes that I will be taking during the interview will be securely stored and used for research purposes only.
[started recording] Now I will ask you questions mostly about your experience with firewalls, your thoughts about the firewall configuration process. Is that okay? Please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your opinions and previous experiences. 
APPENDIX B DAMERAU-LEVENSHTEIN DISTANCE
The Damerau-Levenshtein distance is a string metric. If given two strings, the metric returns a value that equals the minimum number of basic operations required to transform the first string into the second one. The set of basic operations includes:
• Insertion of a single character.
• Deletion of a single character.
• Replacement of one character with another.
• Transposition of two adjacent symbols. The motivation for selecting the Full Damerau-Levenshtein distance is that it allows a comparison of strings of not equal length and demonstrates compliance with the following three conditions, which, in turn, are prerequisites for being a metric: [33] .
It is important to mention here that the DamerauLevenshtein algorithm compares two strings character-wise. However, we want to use this metric to compare lists of keys of different rules that are used, and keys can be longer than one symbol. To solve this issue, we use a mapping table, where every key that is longer than one symbol is mapped to one non-used ASCII symbol. Hereafter, when calculating the distance between two rules, long keys are replaced by ASCII symbols from the table. An example of the table for one Iptables rule set is shown in Figure 6 . 
APPENDIX C PERCEIVED COGNITIVE EFFORT
An example of one SMEQ scale, obtained in the perceived cognitive effort study, is depicted in Figure 7 .
APPENDIX D STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED COGNITIVE EFFORT STUDY
We would like to present some details about the statistical analysis performed in this study.
• The p-values in Table 2 are not adjusted. The subjects completed a single test and the outcome was sorted according to the D-L distances. Four pairs were tested using a repeated planned within subject contrast test. Adjusting the p-values with Bonferroni (four pairs) did not alter our results (adjusted p-values < 0.05).
• The pairwise t-test shows whether the difference between the weight factor values for different distances is significant. Logistic regression shows the form of the dependence of the weight factor on the distance. That is why both were included in the paper.
